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 1 
Abstract 
The article analyses the neglected relationship between networks and unemployment. It challenges 
the neo-classic understanding of the transition from unemployment to employment and elaborates 
the line of reasoning within economic sociology. Based on theories of information problems at the 
labour market it is argued that networks are of special importance for unemployed. At the same 
time unemployed is likely to lose network, which starts a vicious circle. Due to a formalised labour 
market, high integration of long-term unemployed and a number of other factors Denmark comes 
close to a worst case for this line of reasoning. However, based on comprehensive surveys it is 
shown that employers do hire through informal channels, do use referrals, and are suspicious when 
hiring unemployed. It is also shown that unemployed do lose network, especially so-called occupa-
tional ties, which significantly reduces their chances of employment.   
 
Key words: Economic incentives, Networks, recruitment, social capital, unemployment 
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Introduction 
In economic text books the labour market is often introduced as any other market; the commodity is 
labour, the price is the wage, the buyers are employers and the sellers are workers. The market fluc-
tuates (in the short run) until it clears and thereby find an equilibrium. If the demand is larger than 
the supply then the wages will increase, whereby workers will supply more labour. If supply is 
higher than demand then wages will decrease, whereby more employers will demand more labour. 
In this perfect market there is only voluntary unemployment. If unemployment was not voluntary 
then unemployed would offer their labour at a lower price. Thereby demand for labour would in-
crease until everybody works for the new equilibrium wage. This elegant package is, with a number 
of modifications, the point of departure for neo-classic labour market theory. Therefore it is a main 
line of reasoning that unemployment is caused by the fact that state intervention, e.g. through un-
employment benefits and social assistance schemes, have disturbed the market by generating incen-
tive problems – sometimes even labelled unemployment traps.  
However, the idea of the perfect market is also a good point of departure for our alter-
native line of reasoning. The smooth mechanisms of the perfect market are namely dependent on 
full information and the exchange of standard commodities. Thus, employers have to be aware of 
all potential workers (and their wage demands) and workers have to be aware of all job openings 
(and the wage offered). It is also assumed that one worker easily can be replaced with another 
worker (that requires a lower wage) and that an employer easily can be replaced with another em-
ployer (that offers a higher wage). In any market it is impossible to fulfil these assumptions but the 
labour market comes close to a worst case. Human beings are clearly not a standard commodity and 
it is obvious that workers cannot be aware of all job openings and employers cannot be aware of all 
(potential) workers. Therefore the market mechanisms do not work smoothly, which especially be-
comes problematic for unemployed (see below).  
 The information problem is actually well recognised within modern economic theory. 
In 2001 Spence, Akerlof and Stiglizt got the Nobel Prize in economy for their work on economic 
models with lack of information. Most famous is Spence’s Job market signalling model (1973). The 
idea is that employers cannot observe the true productivity of a given worker, which makes hiring a 
risky business. In such a market the applicants will be judged on some average assumption about 
productivity, so-called statistical discrimination. The media example is a high productive immigrant 
who never makes it to the job interview due to the fact that the average productivity of immigrant 
workers is low. However, Spence makes an important distinction between indices and signals. Indi-
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ces are personal characteristics such as age, sex and ethnicity, which the workers cannot change. 
Signals are personal characteristics such as education, appearance etc., which the workers can 
change and invest in. Now the idea is that high productive workers more easily than low productive 
workers can obtain educational degrees. Therefore high productive workers will be inclined to in-
vest in education, which then is a signal of their true productivity. Thus, the provoking claim is that 
education is a selection mechanism that works even in the case when education does not contribute 
to increased productivity in it selves. We just want to add that the line of reasoning is most suitable 
for a situation where someone outside the labour market wants to enter the labour market, i.e. un-
employment is more interesting than transitions from one job to another.  
 Though information problems are recognised most economic theories are reluctant to 
see the market as an institution embedded in and dependent on a larger social context, which is the 
main claim within the small sociological tradition labelled economic sociology. Within this tradi-
tion the seminal work on labour market is Mark Grannovetter’s book from 1974, “Getting a job”, 
which had networks as the focal point  The crucial point is that networks, i.e. ties to family, friends 
and acquaintances, carry information about job openings (see Calvó-Armengol & Jackson, 2004, 
for a number of economic studies that also include networks). In the Boston area Grannovetter ana-
lysed 282 men working in professional, technical, or managerial occupations who had changed job 
within the last year. The main finding was that informal networks were used intensively when these 
workers got a new job. The high degree of informal recruitment has been confirmed by a number of 
following studies (see Grannovetter, 1995, Lin, 1999, or Marsden & Gorman, 2001 for an over-
view). The sociologists tend to take for granted that societies are made of networks and therefore 
they have not felt a strong need to explain why networks actually are of high importance for getting 
job. However, by combining the idea of networks with the economists’ thinking of markets and 
information problems the line of reasoning can be improved quite a lot.  
First of all, networks are an easy and cheap way to announce a vacancy, i.e. the trans-
action costs connected to spreading or gathering information (Williamson, 1985) are relatively low. 
Secondly, networks offer information that cannot be observed from either indices or signals. The 
employers do not only want to know about sex, age, race, educational level etc. Employers also 
want to know, especially when hiring an unemployed, about the general job motivation, whether 
he/she will be able to socialise with other employees, customers etc. Thus, networks give access to 
more sufficient information. Finally, and most interestingly for economic theory, networks also give 
access to trustworthy information. The market failure described by Akerlof, one the other Nobel 
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prize winners from 2001, in his famous article about used cars (1970) is caused by the fact that the 
information is asymmetric distributed. The owner knows something about the car that the buyers do 
not know, e.g. whether it is a “lemon” (a bad assembled car). And the owner has a clear incentive to 
hide the facts if the car actually is a “lemon”. Therefore the buyers are extremely cautious when 
buying a used car and the price is typically too low. The same is the case at the labour market. The 
workers have information about themselves, which the employers cannot access, and they have a 
clear incentive to present themselves in the best manner. And the other way around; employers have 
information about themselves, e.g. about the work pressure, limited carrier possibilities etc, which 
the applicants cannot access. Therefore there is a large demand for trustworthy information at the 
labour market. Especially in the case of hiring an unemployed employers can be expected to be cau-
tious; the person could be a “lemon”, which already had been dismissed by other employers. When 
employers hire through an already employee the latter can provide trustworthy information about 
the new worker (given the assumption that the already employee wants to maintain a good relation-
ship with the employers). Thus, based on an economic theoretical framework we can explain why 
networks are of great of importance in general and even more so in case of unemployment. For 
some reasons (see below) the sociological tradition following Grannovetter has not paid much at-
tention to the question of networks and unemployment, which is the point of departure for this arti-
cle.  
The article is divided into seven sections. In the first section be briefly review the 
small discussion economic sociologists have had about networks and unemployment. The following 
sections add knowledge to these discussions by analysing how recruitment process takes places in a 
Western country, Denmark, where recruitment in general, and especially in the case of unemployed, 
is believed to be much formalised. By means of a comprehensive survey material collected in 
2006/7 (see section two) the articles describes how employers actually recruit (section three), how 
employed and unemployed are embedded in different networks (section four), and how unemployed 
and employed actually got information about vacancies (section five). Section six establishes a sta-
tistical model that shows that networks seemingly are more important than economic incentives. 
The findings are summarised in the last section. 
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Networks and unemployment – a neglected theme  
Within the sociological research tradition, primarily American, the main focus has been how access 
to networks influences the overall societal stratification; typically measured as annual income.  Es-
pecially, it has been discussed how so-called weak ties (acquaintances) are better than strong ties 
(family and close friends) to foster upwards social mobility. The argument is that strong ties only 
give access to information about job openings within the narrow social surroundings. In contrast 
weak ties give access to broader social surroundings and can cross social strata. Thereby they may 
give access to more jobs (Grannovetter 1973) and better jobs (Lin, Enseln & Vaughn, 1981). Most 
studies have also replicated Grannovetter’s design where a group of employed that recently have 
changed jobs was asked how they got to know about this job. Using this procedure there are only 
few previously unemployed in the sample and therefore we do not have solid empirical evidence 
about how networks influence the transition from unemployment to employment. Furthermore, re-
cent studies using better statistical modelling have questioned the link between networks and 
wages/job prestige (e.g. Mouw 2003), i.e. the impact on overall stratification, which makes the case 
of transition from unemployment to employment even more interesting.  
From the general study we can naturally deduce that ‘…where and how we spend our 
working hours … depend very much on how we are embedded in networks of social contact” 
(Granovetter, 1995; 141). And we can make the obvious claim that these networks of social con-
tacts are not equally distributed among citizens. The family and the friends of the family are to a 
large extent inherited. Furthermore, it is well known that we tend to find friends that look very 
much like ourselves. So if one belongs to a stratum that is of high risk of unemployment it is likely 
that many of ones friends also are unemployed. In a US context this was e.g. believed to be an im-
portant factor in Wilson’s study about the origin of the urban underclass (Wilson, 1996). Finally, 
Grannovetter found that the few responds that had an unemployment spell between the two jobs had 
used the strong ties more (1974:54), which turned into the argument that “strong ties have greater 
motivation to be of assistance and are typically more easily available” (1982:113). Therefore one 
could argue that the strong ties will be activated during unemployment.   
To these ‘static’ lines of reasoning one could add the possibility of positive and vi-
cious circles. Being employed normally increases a person’s number of social contacts, which 
might start a positive circle that makes it easier and easier to get recommendations and information 
about job openings. The other way around being unemployed might make it more and more difficult 
to get recommendations and information about job openings. First of all unemployed loses contact 
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with former colleagues. Secondly, it is also a general claim that unemployed over time isolate them-
selves from other forms of networks (e.g. Jahoda, 1992). Thirdly, over time, the employers naturally 
become more and more afraid of hiring a “lemon”. Thus, unemployed can be caught in a trap 
whether they become more and more dependent on networks, which they at the same time gradually 
lose (see Calvó-Armengol & Jackson, 2004, for formal model for the latter proposition). 
One exception to the rule of studying a sample of employed is a Swedish study where 
Korpi (2001) finds a relationship between the size of networks among unemployed and employment 
chances. However, even based on this study we do not know whether networks are more or less 
relevant for unemployed than for employed. Korpi suggests that networks might be more important 
for the less intense job search of the already employed and less important for the intense job haunt 
of the unemployed that often (at least in the Swedish case) is supported by public employment of-
fices. As the Danish data also include a sample of ordinary employed it gives us a unique possibility 
to test this preposition. Finally, even though the article was titled “Good friends in bad times” 
Korpi’s data did not allow him describe the suggested impact of strong ties in bad times.  
 
Country selection and data: A best case for formal recruitment  
Our empirical analysis is based on a comprehensive survey material from Denmark. We do not have 
much cross-country knowledge about recruitment processes but as already mentioned Denmark can 
be seen as a best case for formal recruitment of unemployed; 1) In contrast to the US, where most of 
the network studies have been conducted, Denmark has a national employment agency that operates 
a nationwide system of employment agencies. 2) Denmark is the OECD country that spends most 
money per unemployed one active labour market policy (2000). The unemployed are offered 
courses in writing applications, job training, education etc. Thus, as in the Swedish case, serious 
attempts to make unemployed less dependent on their networks have been implemented. 3) By 
comparative European standards the degree of job protection is very low, close to UK and US, 
which theoretically should make employers less worried about hiring a “lemon”. 4) Denmark is a 
country with very low corruption and one of the highest level of interpersonal trust (Larsen, 2007), 
which should enhance the faith in information that employers and employee give each other. 5) Fi-
nally, the level of unemployment was low at the time of interview, around 4 percent (OECD stan-
dardised). A number of studies of companies’ recruitment behaviour suggest that informal recruit-
ment is used from frequently in times of recession, where it is easy to obtain labour and where the 
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screening costs connected to formal recruitment are higher (Wood, 1985, Windolf et. al. 1988, 
Russo et al. 2000).  
 Thus, we have reasons to believe informal recruitment is less frequent in Denmark 
than in most other countries. The assumption is supported by the only cross-national indicator of 
informal recruitment of unemployed, which we have been able to find. Studying youth unemploy-
ment in eight countries Harsløf (2006) found that the Danish youth was the least likely to enter the 
labour market through informal channels. Only 30 percent of the Danish youth entered through in-
formal channels, which should be compared to 37 percent in Sweden, 39 percent in Finland, 39 per-
cent in Scotland, 40 percent in Norway, 50 percent in Spain, 57 percent in Germany and 81 percent 
in Italy. This is not a perfect measure but it is fair proxy for the general degree of formality at the 
labour market. Finally it should be mentioned that Denmark have very generous unemployment 
benefits and social assistance, especially for low-income groups, which give Danish unemployed 
better resources to prevent the vicious circles related to unemployment (e.g. Galli & Paugam, 2000). 
 The Danish survey material was gathered in 2006 and 2007 and consists of three stud-
ies.  
 
• Firstly, we have a postal survey among private Danish employers with twenty employees or 
above (manufacturing) or ten employees or above (service). 4000 companies were selected 
from a national register and 1775 returned the questionnaire. The public sector, which 
probably has more formal recruitment procedures than the private sector, was not included 
in the survey.  
 
• Secondly, we have conducted a survey (telephone combined with face to face interviews) 
among three different types of unemployed. The first sample was randomly drawn from a 
population that was fulltime unemployed in the second quarter of 2006. This group receives 
either unemployment benefits or social assistance but is not troubled by large social prob-
lems, which allow them not to be available for the labour market. Among the 1810 selected 
we managed to interview 969. The second sample was randomly drawn from the citizens 
that participated in activation measures (minimum one month in the second quarter of 2006). 
When participating in these measures these citizens are no longer registered in the former 
register. Therefore we had to take two samples. Among the 1023 selected we managed to in-
terview 459. The third sample was taken among all social assistance claimants, also those 
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with problems besides unemployment, that had received benefits for a minimum of three 
months the second half of 2005. Among the 1248 selected we managed to interview 509. In 
the article these groups are merged into a sample of long-term unemployed. At the time of 
interview during the autumn 2006 and spring 2007 many of these unemployed had entered a 
wage earner job. This gives us a large group of “previously long-term unemployed” 
(N=487) and a group of “continued long-term unemployed” (N=737). Those who have be-
come students, early retired, self-employed etc. have been excluded from the sample. In the 
sample unemployed above 54 years and immigrants between 18-54 years were over-
sampled. Therefore we operate with weighted data that transform the sample into a represen-
tative sample.   
 
• Thirdly, we have conducted a survey among citizens who are not registered as being early 
retired or unemployed. Among the 3902 selected we managed to interview 1875. Among 
this group only wage earners are included (N=1075). In the sample employed above 59 
years old was over-sampled. Again the data is weighted in order to reach a representative 
sample of wage earners. 
 
The employer’s recruitment behaviour  
In the survey among private companies the persons in charge of human relations has been asked 
through which channels the company normally announce a new vacancy. The most used channel for 
recruitment was through job bases at the Internet. 24 percent of the companies “always” use this 
channel and 47 percent “mostly” use this channel. Thus, the Internet has certainly become a very 
important tool that probably has reduced some of the information problems at the labour market. 
However, the second most used channel is to spread the word of a vacancy through the already em-
ployed. 16 percent of the companies “always” use this channel and 45 percent “mostly” use this 
channel. Furthermore, 9 percent “always” and 31 percent “mostly” spread the word among the em-
ployer’s others contacts in the branch. Thus, even at the formalised Danish labour market we find a 
large tendency to announce vacancies through informal channels. Actually, the national employ-
ment agency is not used very frequently. 32 percent of the private companies “never” and 40 per-
cent “rarely” announce vacancies here. Therefore the unemployed is more on their own than one 
could expect form the institutional settings found in Denmark – and the money spent.  
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 There is no doubt that the Internet can solve some of the problems about getting the 
knowledge about job openings. But it cannot solve the problem with asymmetric distributed and not 
trustworthy information. This can be seen by the fact that recommendations clearly affect employ-
ment chances. In the survey we asked to what extent various forms of recommendations improve 
the job chances (see table 1).  
 
Table 1. The importance of various forms of recommendations for employment chances. Per-
cent.  
 Origin of recommendation: 
 Own em-
ployees 
Former 
employer, 
orally 
Other in 
the branch 
Former em-
ployer, written 
Educational 
institution 
Personal at 
the employ-
ment agency 
Decisive 13 10 6 5 1 1 
Of great 
importance 
51 46 47 39 13 6 
Of some 
importance 
30 34 39 47 52 36 
Of no im-
portance 
4 8 7 8 28 49 
Don’t know 2 2 2 1 6 10 
N 1723 1728 1723 1731 1711 1711 
 
 
The results indicate that a recommendation from an already employed has the largest effect on the 
employment chances of an applicant. 13 percent of the employers say that such a recommendation 
is “decisive” and 51 percent say that it is of “great importance”. An oral recommendation from a 
former employer might also be of great importance. 10 percent indicate that it is “decisive” and 46 
percent that it is of “great importance”. It is interesting that a written recommendation from a for-
mer employer is of less importance. 5 percent says it is “decisive” and 39 percent that it is of “great 
importance”. Our interpretation is that the face-to-face character of the oral recommendation in-
creases the trustworthiness of the information. In between comes recommendation from other con-
tacts in the branch. 6 percent says it is “decisive” and 47 percent says it is of great importance. Rec-
ommendations from educational institutions do not improve the employment chances much. 28 per-
cent says it is of “no importance” and 52 percent that it is only of “some importance”. Finally the 
survey reveals that a recommendation from a job agent in the national employment agency is of 
least importance. 49 percent says it is of “no importance” and 36 percent says of “some impor-
tance”. That the trustworthiness of such a recommendation is low is actually very logical, as it is the 
job of the job agents to especially help the weakest unemployed.  
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Finally the survey shows that the employers are extremely sensitive to the length of 
unemployment when hiring an unemployed. 42 percent of the employers indicated that their was 
particular risks connected to hiring unemployed above 50 years old and  84 percent indicated par-
ticular risks connected to hiring unemployed immigrants. But 100 percent indicated that there were 
particular risks connected to hiring unemployed with long previous unemployment. The employers 
also indicated that the two former groups have much better employment chances than the latter 
group. Thus, being unemployed for a longer period is a very bad signal, which is likely to increase 
the importance of referrals; at least if they are to enter the private sector. Therefore it is highly in-
teresting to measure these ties to the labour market. 
 
Differences in networks between ordinary employed, continued unemployed, and previously 
unemployed 
As already mentioned the tradition that follows Grannovetter’s seminal work distinguishes between 
strong and weak ties. Below it is argue that, at least in the Danish context, the suggested impact of 
strong ties in the case of unemployment, such as family, and even ‘medium’ ties such as friends, 
seem to be exaggerated.  First of all the data show that in terms of contact with the close family 
(parents, brothers, sisters and children not living at home) there are no large differences between 
our samples of continued unemployed, previously unemployed and ordinary employed. With 58 
percent being in contact “weekly or more” with their close family, and 32 percent approximately 
“every months” the ordinary employed are only slightly more in contact with the close family and 
the two other figures. The figures were respectively 51 percent and 24 percent for previously unem-
ployed and 54 percent and 21 percent for continued unemployed. Thus, the traditional isolation the-
sis does not seem to hold for the contact with close family.  
It is also remarkable that the isolation thesis neither seem to hold for contacts with 
friends. The continued unemployed and the previously unemployed actually seem to be more in 
contact with friends than the ordinary employed. In the former two groups the share that had weekly 
contact is respectively 62 percent and 66 percent compared to 57 percent among ordinary em-
ployed. This finding is confirmed in previous Danish studies (Goul Andersen, 2002). It should be 
mentioned that in our sample 6 percent of the continued unemployed indicate that they have no 
friends. However, in most cases the strong ties to the close family and the “medium ties” to the 
friends seem to be upheld during periods of unemployment. The weak ties, such as participation in 
associations, are more endangered. 40 percent of the ordinary employed have actively participated 
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in associations within the last year, which should be compared to 25 percent of the previously em-
ployed and 25 percent of the continued unemployed. This finding is also supported by previous re-
sults (ibid) but the lack of differences between two latter groups seems to indicate that it does not 
make a large difference for employment chances. Thus, as expected long-term unemployed is well-
integrated into Danish society, which actually makes it a worst case for showing the importance of 
networks.1  
 However, no matter have well-integrated Danish long-term unemployed are in the 
broader society it is fairly obvious that they still lose the most relevant ties; occupational ties, i.e. 
ties to persons and employers within the given sector of the individual. To put is bluntly; if you are 
a mechanic it is not of much use to be in regular contact with family, friends, or even a high status 
acquaintance, e.g. a doctor (Lin 1999) if they cannot provide information from the relevant branch. 
The company survey clearly demonstrated that the most important contacts were those to already 
employed at the company. Unfortunately, it is not an easy task to compare these occupational ties 
across our three samples; those who become employed naturally get these ties at the new job. 
Therefore it is more interesting to measure to what extent the ties of the continued employed are 
still active. We have asked about the frequency of contact with former colleagues, other employees 
and employers in their former sectors of work (see table 2). 
 
Table 2. Ties to the labour market among continued unemployed 
  All By length of previous unemployment 
   <1 year 2-4 years 4 years or more 
Contact with former colleagues      
 Monthly or more 24 49 28 12 
 Less than monthly 14 14 20 13 
 No contact 47 38 52 74 
 Never been employed 15    
Contact with other employees 
in the branch 
    
 Monthly or more 26 46 26 23 
 Less than monthly 13 18 17 10 
 No contact 47 36 58 68 
 Never been employed 15    
Contact with former employers     
 Monthly or more 11 22 12 4 
 Less than monthly 10 16 13 7 
 No contact 65 62 75 89 
 Never been employed 14    
N (unweighed, minimum): 723 160 247 207 
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The surveys indicate that the unemployed lose many of the occupational ties. 13 percent of the con-
tinued unemployed have never had employment, 47 percent indicate that they have no contact with 
former colleagues, 47 percent have no contact with other employees in the sector where they have 
formerly worked, and 65 have no contact to employers. However, a fair share of the continued em-
ployed also have active ties to the labour market. 24 percent have monthly (or more) contact with 
former colleagues. 26 percent and 11 percent have monthly contact respectively with other employ-
ees and employers in the sectors they have formerly worked. But the table clearly shows that these 
occupational ties erode over time. 74 percent of those who have been unemployed for four years or 
more have no contact to former colleagues. The share is 52 percent among those who have been 
unemployed between one to four years and 38 percent among those who have been unemployed 
less than a year. The share with no contact to other colleagues in former sectors decreases from 68 
percent to 36 percent. And the share with no contacts to employers decreases from 89 percent to 62 
percent. Thus, the long-term unemployed do lose contacts to the persons, which according to the 
employers are best to be recommended by.  
 
Roads into employment 
In the previous section we demonstrated a correlation between occupational ties and employment 
status. However, one could still discuss whether it is a causal effect or not (e.g. Mouw, 2003). The 
question about how various groups got their present employment takes us somewhat closer to causal 
mechanism. As in the other surveys within the field we have asked how the respondents got infor-
mation about the job but in contrast to the other surveys we have distinguished between general ties 
to family, friends and acquaintances and ties that originate from the respondents former jobs.  
When we ask the ordinary employed how they heard about their present job we get re-
sults that confirm the results from other countries; a large group, in this case 38 percent, got job 
informal through informal channels. 35 percent got information through the mass media and 29 
percent through various other channels; the respondents could indicate more than one channel but 
the vast majority (1181 out of 1194) was able to pin point one channel. The use of informal chan-
nels underpins the argument of network. However, more interesting is the fact that contacts from 
former jobs, the occupational ties, with 13 percent seem to be more important than the strong ties of 
the family (6 percent) and as important as friends/acquaintances (13 percent); if a person both is a 
friend and a colleague her or she was coded as the latter. Furthermore 6 percent had heard about 
their job from former activation i.e. periods of job training in private companies or the public sector, 
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education program, job search courses etc. These ties could also be labelled occupational ties. The 
same could the 8 percent that was directly contacted by their employers. Thus, one could argue that 
occupational ties actually are used much more than the friends/acquaintances.  
 
Table 3. How ordinary employed and previously unemployed heard about their present job. 
Percent1 
  Ordinary 
employed: 
 
Previously unemployed by unemployment 
within five years: 
   
All previ-
ously unem-
ployed 
Below one 
year 
One to two 
years 
Above two 
years 
Informal ties in all (1-4) 38 35 43 33 23 
1: Occupational ties - con-
tacts from former jobs (ordi-
nary)  
13 7 12 10 0 
2: Contacts from former 
activation 
6 6 4 6 7 
3: Weak ties: Friends/ ac-
quaintances 
13 16 19 11 11 
4: Strong ties: Family 6 6 8 6 5 
5: Mass media (incl. Inter-
net) 
35 37 33 34 36 
Other channels in all (6-9) 29 32 29 35 42 
6: Emp. office 1 8 10 9 12 
7: Ccontacted by employer 8 5 4 4 5 
8: Nnot invited application  9 8 5 12 12 
9: Others 10 11 10 10 13 
N (weighted) 1194 482 155 115 85 
1 The categories add up to more than 100 percent because it is a multiple choice question. 
  
 
When we compare the channels of job information of all the previously unemployed with the ordi-
nary employed the overall shares that got informal through informal channels, mass media or other 
channels do not differ very much. The largest differences are that the previously unemployed, as 
expected, rely more on the employment office, 8 percent compared to 1 percent, and less on the 
occupational ties, 7 percent compared to 13 percent. However, the average figures hide large varia-
tions within the group of previously unemployed. Those who had been unemployed less than year 
within the last five years have actually used informal channels, 43 percent, more often than ordinary 
employed. Thus, in contrast to Korpi’s reasoning they actually make more use of informal contacts 
than ordinary employed. The short-term unemployed use occupational ties as much as ordinary em-
ployed (12 percent compared to 13 percent) and rely even more on friends/acquaintances (19 per-
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cent compared to 13 percent). In the group of short term unemployed the strong ties of the family is 
also used a little more (8 percent) than among ordinary employed (6 percent).  
However, only 23 percent the long-term unemployed (above two years within last five 
years) had got their job information through informal channels, which supports Korpi’s line of rea-
soning. None of them had used occupational ties, only 11 percent had used friends, and most inter-
esting only 5 percent used the family. Thus, based on a large sample of previously unemployed the 
thesis of strength of strong ties when it comes to unemployed cannot be confirmed. The data sug-
gest that the trade-off is not between weak and strong ties but between informal and formal recruit-
ment. Thus, the long-term unemployed have to rely more the employment offices and not invited 
application. The higher degree of formality is not interpreted as a sign of these channels being more 
effective for this group but rather as consequence of the fact that many simply have lost their occu-
pational ties. Based on the findings from the company survey we actually suggest that recommenda-
tions would be of even more importance for this group and the higher degree of formality is inter-
preted as a sign of the suggested vicious circle of unemployment.  
 
Economic incentives versus networks  
Whether the effect from networks emphasised by economic sociology is something that force us to 
slightly adjust or totally dismiss the neo-classic understanding on the labour market cannot be 
solved on empirical grounds; it is a matter of perspective. Nevertheless, in the last part of our analy-
sis we will try to formalize the argument and estimate the relative importance of (short-term) eco-
nomic incentives and networks. Our data are not truly longitudinal but by asking in retrospect we 
are able to build a time dimension into the data. The previously unemployed and the ordinary em-
ployed that have been unemployed within the last five years (N=166) have been asked about the 
number of people they knew within their current sector at the time of unemployment (the independ-
ent variable). They have also been asked about the economic gain of being employed, when tax and 
extra expenses to transport and childcare are subtracted (the competing independent variable). As to 
the dependent variable we use the average duration of unemployment spells in the past five year 
period and the overall length of unemployment within last five years.  
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Table 4. Relationship between economic incentives, occupational ties, contact with family, 
contact with friends and duration of unemployment spells within last five years. MCA-
analysis, Beta and level of significance.  
 Model I: 
 
Model II: 
 Duration of 
spells 
(months) 
(bivariate) 
Esti-
mated 
dura-
tion of 
spells, 
months 
(con-
trolled) 
Beta Overall 
length 
within five 
years 
(bivariate) 
Estimated  
Overall 
length 
within five 
years (con-
trolled) 
Beta 
Contact in the sector at time of 
unemployment 
      
 0  12,3 12.3 0.18** 19.3 17.2 0.16** 
 1- 4 12,4 13.0  22.2 21.2  
 5 – 9  11,9 11.1  18.0 20.1  
 10 – 19 7,5 7.9  12.2 12.8  
 20 – 49 7,3 7.5  12.2 13.9  
 50 or more 5,1 4.8  9.7 13.7  
Gain from employment per 
month:  
      
 Below 500 DKR (65 euro) 11,3 11.1 0.05ns 25.1 23.7 0.15** 
 500 to 3000 DKR 11,0 11.0  16.5 14.7  
 3000 to 6000 DKR 10,4 10.4  15.7 16.3  
 Above 6000 DKR (780 euro) 8,7 9.1  14.1 16.8  
Male   0.05ns  16.8 0.01ns 
Female     17.3  
17-29 
 7.7 0.18**  12.5 0.18** 
30 – 39 
 10.0   15.8  
40 – 49   12.9   18.9  
50 - 59  11.8   23.0  
60 or above  8.8   17.2  
No education above basic school  11.1 0.11Ns  21.2 0.17** 
Unskilled worker (education 
below one year) 
 7.7   9.7  
Skilled worker  8.7   13.7  
Further education (short)  11.7   17.7  
Further education (medium)  11.7   17.2  
Further education (long)  10.3   16.1  
Danish  9.6 0.17**  16.2 0.12** 
Immigration (first / second gen-
eration) 
 15.7   23.0  
Sample 1: Ordinary unemployed  10.9 0.21**  18.0 0.20** 
Sample 2: Activated  13.8   19.1  
Sample 3: Social assistance  12.8   23.7  
Sample 4: Ordinary employed  6.7   11.3  
R2   0.20   0.20 
N (Not weighted)    405   431 
Note: ** significant at 0.01 level, * significant at 0.05 level, ns above 0.05. 
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Using a multi-classification analysis (MCA) model I shows that the number of occupational ties 
significantly reduces the duration of unemployment spells. In the sample the average duration of an 
unemployment spell is 10.3 months. However, among those with 0 to 9 occupational ties the aver-
age spell was around 12 months. Among those with 50 occupational ties or more the average dura-
tion was only around 5 months. The relationship is strong and significant even after controlling for 
variations in sex, age, education, ethnicity, sample type, and economic incentives. The beta value, 
measuring the impact of all the brackets of occupational ties, is 0.18. Naturally, there still might be 
unobserved heterogeneity (see Larsen et al, forthcoming from a more thoroughly control procedure) 
but from what we can observe there is a strong impact. Knowing ‘50 persons or more’ compared to 
only knowing  ‘1 to 4 persons’ in a given sector is e.g. estimated to reduce the duration of unem-
ployment spells from 13.0 to 4.8 months.  In contrast the economic incentives do not even have 
significant impact on the duration of unemployment spells. Those who gained below 65 euros a 
months from employment do not have much longer spells (estimated to be 11.1 months) than those 
who gained above 780 euros (estimated to be 9.1 months). The beta-value is 0.05 and it does not 
even turn significant. The modest of effect of variations in economic incentives on the escape rate 
of long-term unemployed in the Danish context is confirmed by two recent longitudinal studies 
(Larsen, 2003; Smith et. al. 2003). This would suggest that the economic sociological position is 
able to explain much of the transition from unemployment to employment whereas the neo-classic 
position seems more or less irrelevant in the Danish context.  
 However, model II, measuring the length of overall employment within the last five 
years, moderates the conclusion. The number of occupational ties still has a strong and significant 
impact on overall length of unemployment (beta value 0.16) but the extreme position of the very 
well connected (50 or above contacts) found in model I is moderated. Actually, it is understandable 
that having a lot of contacts does not necessarily prevent workers from being fired but certainly 
allow them to find new job very quickly; i.e. the average duration time of spells decreases.  In terms 
of overall length of unemployment within the last five years the main divided seem to be between 
those who know less than 10 persons (estimated duration between 17.2 – 21.2 months) and those 
who know more (estimated duration between 12.8 to 13.7 months). Furthermore, economic incen-
tives are estimated to have a significant impact, beta 0.16, on the overall duration of unemployment. 
It is caused by the fact that those who gain below 65 euros have experienced 25.1 months of unem-
ployed (controlled 23.7 months), whereas there are no significant differences between the other 
three groups. As the group with very low incentives does not have much longer duration of spells 
(estimated to 11.1 months) the effect is caused by the fact that this group simply have more spells. In 
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a neo-classic line of reasoning the interpretation could be that very low economic incentives do not 
reduce your chances of getting a job, maybe helped by the active Danish labour market policy, but 
increase the chances of leaving a job. Nevertheless, in terms of overall unemployment occupational 
ties are still as strong a predictor (beta 0.16) as economic incentives (0.15). As to the control variables 
age, ethnicity and sample origin is shown to have a significant effect on the average duration of un-
employment spells, whereas sex and level of education turns insignificant. In terms of overall unem-
ployment length the level of education also turns significant. 
  
Conclusion  
Though neglected by the neo-classic literature and to some extent also by the sociological literature 
following the seminal work by Mark Grannovetter (1974) the article has shown that the network per-
ceptive contributes significantly to our understanding of the transition from unemployment to em-
ployment. Based on recent economic literature on information problems it was argued that it is fairly 
easy to understand that networks should be of special importance in the case of unemployment; both 
seen from an employer perceptive, as unemployed might be perceived as “lemons”, and from an indi-
vidual perspective, as unemployed gradually lose networks. This is believed to constitute two impor-
tance elements in the vicious circle of unemployment. 
 In many respects Denmark provided a worst case for verifying this line of reasoning. 
However, using comprehensive survey material the article showed that Danish employers do use in-
formal channels of recruitment, do emphasise the importance of referrals from own employees, and 
are suspicious when hiring a long-term unemployed. The article also showed that even though most 
Danish long term unemployed are not isolated from family, friends and the broader society they do 
lose contacts to the labour market. By comparing the roads into employment of ordinary employed 
and unemployed it was also shown that short term unemployed make more use of informal channels 
than ordinary employed, whereas the long term unemployed were left with the formal channels. Thus, 
in contrast to previous suggestions the trade-off was not between weak and strong ties but between 
formal and informal recruitment. Finally, it was shown that in the Danish case occupational ties was a 
better predictor of the average duration of unemployment spells than economic incentives; an as a 
good predictor for the overall length of unemployment. One can naturally discuss the possibilities for 
generalising but we suggest that the presented network effects would be of even higher importance in 
countries without national employment agencies, less active labour market policy, less generous bene-
fits, higher job protection and less demand for labour.
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 We have also asked about the labour market positions of partners, close families and friends. The findings verifies 
previous findings that show a low family concentration of unemployment in the Danish case (Goul Andersen, 2002). 
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